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Abstract. Although many charities have a web presence, almost all of
them have been designed to accept credit cards as the only means for
making donations. The anonymity requirements of many donors, how-
ever, make the existing means of donation inappropriate for them. In this
paper we investigate the business need for an internet charity donation
scheme, identify the security requirements such a scheme should fulfill,
and propose a scheme that uses an anonymous electronic cash technique
to make donations, and that employs smart cards for donation distribu-
tion. Finally, we analyse how the proposed scheme matches the identified
security requirements.
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1 Introduction
Giving charity is a common activity for many individuals; for instance giving
charity is an integral part of the Islamic faith. One occasion for making charitable
donations is the month of Ramadan, where, after completing a month of fasting,
Muslims celebrate Eid, the festival of the breaking of the fast. It is also an
occasion to make a special donation to the poor. All Muslims who have enough
money to take care of their own family’s needs must make this donation. The
amount of donation is the same regardless of their income.
On the other hand, the Internet and e-commerce are changing individual
lives considerably. The Internet excels at facilitating the exchange of informa-
tion and goods, and what better use for this exchange than giving to those in
need? With the ever growing popularity of the Internet, the transition from tra-
ditional commerce to electronic commerce is becoming a reality. This transition
is supported by the convenience, speed and ease of use of the new commerce
scenarios. Electronic payments are a crucial component in the development of
e-commerce.
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Although the necessary technology is already in place, most charities do not
take advantage of the ubiquity of the Internet and recent developments in smart
card technology. However, individuals are increasingly prepared to donate online.
According to [3], of those Internet users who are likely to make a donation online,
52% have purchased a product or service over the Internet, making online buyers
more likely to give online than other Internet users.
Currently, almost all online donation mechanisms found on charity Web sites
are based on electronic credit card transactions. This is a potential problem since
these systems do not provide any anonymity to the donor. Privacy concerns are
a barrier to online donations just as they have been for e-commerce transactions.
According to [3], concerns about privacy and credit card security remain high.
71% of donors said they were concerned about the security of their personal
information online. Nearly 90% said they would never give their credit card
information out to a charity. The current situation could be changed if a new
electronic payment scheme for charity donations can be devised.
In this paper, we introduce the concept of e-donation, the electronic coun-
terpart of a charity donation. We propose a scheme that allows donations to
be made anonymously and distributed to recipients using smart cards, allow-
ing recipients to redeem their e-donations directly from a shop. In particular
the scheme involves the donor contributing a specific amount of money to the
charity, which then arranges for the recipient to receive goods of precisely the
value contributed by the donor. Moreover the donor can specify the nature of the
goods to be made available to the recipient. Whilst this is not a model of chari-
table donation of general applicability, it matches the particular requirements of
certain scenarios, e.g. the obligation on Muslims to make donations during Eid
(as described above).
2 System Model
In this section, we describe our model for Internet charity transactions. The
model identifies the entities involved and includes a brief description of their
interactions.
2.1 Participants
We now examine each of the participants in an electronic payment scheme for
charitable donations.
– Donor: A person who wishes to donate to a charity anonymously using the
Internet.
– Charity: A charity is an intermediary between the donor and the recipient.
It generates and issues e-donations to the recipients. It trusts the Pseudonym
Server to issue valid electronic coins to the donors.
– Recipient: A recipient is the entity that receives goods when redeeming an
e-donation from a participating store. Each recipient has a smart card sup-
plied by his charity. This card holds e-donations (specifying particular goods)
issued by the charity which the holder can redeem from a participating store
at a convenient time.
– Store: A store is an entity willing to promote its goods through participation
in the scheme. It has an agreement with a charity to exchange e-donations
generated by that charity for goods described in the e-donations. It uses a
terminal to receive e-donations from the recipient smart card.
– Certification authority (CA): A trusted entity that generates public key
certificates for charities, stores, and the pseudonym server.
– Pseudonym server (PS): A trusted entity that will bind cryptographic
data to participants. It provides an infrastructure for issuing anonymous
identities and electronic coins to donors. It is trusted not to revoke the
anonymity of a donor at any time except under certain conditions agreed
upon by all participants. It is trusted by all other parties and should be
managed in such a way that fraud is very unlikely. To cover the operational
costs of providing this kind of service, the PS might make a charge to the
donor and/or the charity.
Trust is a critical issue in payment systems. In our model, we assume that
the store and the charity trust each other. This trust is explicit as the store
and the charity have a formally established agreement that defines the trust and
liability relationship. The donor trusts the charity to deliver his donation to a
deserving recipient. The donor might need a receipt for his donation from the
charity to prove it has been issued to a recipient. All participants trust the CA
and the PS to be honest.
2.2 Interactions
E-donation will provide a recipient of charity with the digital representation of
a right to claim goods of a specified type from a participating store. A partici-
pating store will first need to decide which types of goods it will make available
for distribution via charitable means — for each such item it will generate an
e-donation token. Each such token is a simple data structure containing a de-
scription of the goods to be purchased. Associated with each token will also be
the cost for a donor to purchase a right for a recipient to receive the goods spec-
ified in the token. The charity publishes these e-donation tokens via its web site.
When a donor wishes to donate, he first contacts the PS to get an electronic cash
coin which can only be used to donate to a charity, and an anonymous identity
(pseudonym) used when communicating with a charity. After selecting the kind
of donation he wishes to make at a charity web site, the donor makes the dona-
tion using the electronic cash coin received earlier from the PS. In response the
charity generates an e-donation that satisfies the donor requirements and keeps
it in a database.
When the charity decides to issue an e-donation to a recipient, it retrieves
this e-donation from the database and loads it into the recipient’s smart card.
The recipient collects the goods from a participating store in exchange for the
e-donation contained in the smart card. At a later stage, the store sends all the
redeemed e-donations to their respective charities for clearing.
A great advantage of our scheme is transparency, i.e. the donor knows that
a recipient will receive goods exactly as specified by the donor. Moreover, the
charity does not need to be contacted during each redemption.
3 Security requirements
The purpose of the scheme is to facilitate the transfer of donations from donors
to recipients. However, the scheme provides the potential for considerable fi-
nancial gains for those who attack it successfully. Therefore security measures
must be provided to protect the e-donation transactions. We discuss the security
requirements that our scheme should satisfy.
3.1 Donor Anonymity
When it comes to charity donations, donor privacy is important. This is es-
pecially important in an internet environment where information may travel
through network segments that are not necessarily trusted. The donor wants
anonymity for his donation; neither the charity nor the recipient should be able
to learn the donor’s real identity. There are many reasons why anonymity might
be required in a payment system [2]; in this case, the donor might not wish
charities to be able to link different donations together and build a profile of
his/her behaviour.
However, there are situations where anonymous payments can be misused
for criminal activities [6]. Furthermore, there may be regulatory and legal con-
straints limiting anonymous donations. In order to make an anonymous elec-
tronic charity payment system acceptable to both donors and governments, a
mechanism for limiting donor anonymity may also be needed.
3.2 Double spending
Double spending refers to the possibility of fraudulently spending the same e-
donation more than once. Since e-donations are in digital form, they can readily
be duplicated by the store or by the recipient, who may also blame each other
for any fraudulent behaviour. If double spending does take place, the charity will
not know this until the stores send the redeemed e-donations for clearing.
The scheme should protect against recipients attempting to redeem the same
e-donation more than once and from stores attempting to deposit an e-donation
multiple times. Ideally such double-spending or double-depositing should be pre-
vented, although detection must be possible where prevention is not. Moreover,
only the holder should be able to initiate a redemption transaction. Stores must
be able to detect attempted double-spending without requiring any online veri-
fication from charities.
3.3 Integrity
Integrity ensures that information is not altered by unauthorised participants
during storage or transmission, without detection by the scheme participants.
E-donation data may be manipulated to attack the system. For example, a dis-
honest recipient may try to change an e-donation to extend its validity period
or increase its value. Alternatively, an operator of a false or manipulated store
terminal may interrogate the recipient’s card and extract information which can
later be used to obtain goods from a genuine store (at the expense of the genuine
recipient).
To combat the above threats, it must not be possible to successfully fake or
modify an e-donation.
4 Anonymous Public Keys
The proposed scheme uses anonymous public keys (APKs), i.e. certified public
keys where the owner is anonymous to the verifier [5]. These public keys can
be used in the same way as true public keys. Although the PS knows the user’s
identity, the PS cannot eavesdrop on the user’s encrypted communication or
forge a digital signature of the user.
We now sketch one method of implementing APKs (as described by Oishi
et al. [5]), which applies to public keys for a discrete logarithm based signature
scheme.
1. A user X registers his identity idX and public key PX with the PS, where
PX is generated using a discrete logarithm base g.
2. First, the PS convert the pair (g,PX) to another pair (g′,P ′X). These two
pairs, however, are associated with the same private key SX .
3. Next, the PS generates an anonymous public key certificate that consists of
the converted public key P ′X , additional information (e.g. identity of the PS,
validity period, etc.) and a signature on them generated by the PS.
4. Finally, the PS sends the anonymous public key certificate CertP ′
X
to X.
5 Proposed Scheme
We now present a secure electronic payment scheme for charity donations.
5.1 System set up
When initially establishing the system, the PS must decide on a number of
fundamental system parameters, which must be reliably communicated to all
parties within the system. These include selecting:
– A signature algorithm, where sSX (M) denotes the signature on message M
using the private signing key of entity X,
– A Message Authentication Code (MAC) algorithm, where MACK(M) de-
notes the MAC computed on message M using secret key K,
– A scheme for generating Anonymous Public Keys, and
– An anonymous electronic cash system with revocable anonymity that the PS
must operate; an example of such a system is given in [4].
The CA must also generate its own signature key pair, used for generating
public key certificates, where the CA-generated certificate for public key PX is
written as CertPX .
Prior to use of the system every participating charity and store must generate
and securely store their own secret MAC keys, denotedKC andKS respectively.
Additionally, the participating organisations (charities, stores, and the PS) must
register with the CA operating the system. Registration will involve the organi-
sation (X say):
– Generating a signature key pair, with private key SX and public key PX ,
– Obtaining a certificate CertPX for PX from the CA, and
– Obtaining a reliable copy of the public certificate verification key of the CA.
Each donor must be issued with a smart card by a charity, where smart card
personalisation and issue involve the following steps.
1. The recipient card must be equipped with a signature key pair.
2. During smart card personalisation, the charity stores in the card a copy of
the CA public key, the card expiry date, the charity public key certificate
CertPC , the card public key certificate CertPR signed by the charity, and the
recipient unique identifier idR.
3. To prevent misuse of stolen or borrowed cards, we assume that PIN entry
by the authorised cardholder is required to use a recipient card.
The proposed scheme is composed of five phases: the Initialization phase, in
which the store provides the charity with e-donation tokens that can be redeemed
from the store during a specified interval of time, the Anonymity phase, in which
the donor obtains an anonymous identity and an electronic coin from the PS,
the E-donation definition phase wherein the donor selects an e-donation token
to donate and pays for it, the Donation phase during which the charity loads the
e-donation into a recipient smart card for redemption from a participating store,
and the Redemption phase wherein the recipient pays an e-donation to a par-
ticipating store in exchange for the described goods. In the scheme description,
X||Y denotes the concatenation of data items X and Y .
5.2 Initialization phase
The store provides the charity with a token for generating e-donations that can
be redeemed from the store during a specified interval of time. I.e.
token = s data||MACKS(s data)
where
s data = Item||V alue||Expiry||idS ||idC
and where Item specifies the goods, V alue denotes the cost of the goods, Expiry
indicates the expiry date of the token, and idS and idC are identifiers for the
store and the charity respectively.
The MAC protects the integrity of the token. The charity publishes the re-
ceived e-donation tokens on its web site. This gives the donors choices for the
donations.
5.3 Anonymity phase
This phase involves the donor and the PS. A donor must first obtain an APK
certificate from the PS. Donors then withdraw electronic coins from the PS
which can only be used to purchase e-donations from a participating charity.
The electronic cash system is operated by the PS which acts as a bank to donors
and charities. The charity scheme requires the e-cash system to possess three
main functions (typically involving special purpose exchanges of messages):
– Withdraw(val): A donor withdraws a coin c of value val from the PS.
– Payment(c): A donor pays a charity a coin c to make an e-donation.
– Deposit(c′): A charity deposits a spent coin c′ with the PS which credits the
charity account with the amount of val.
We now describe the anonymity phase:
1. If the donor D does not have an APK certificate from a previous donation,
the donor generates a signature key pair (with private key SD).
2. The donor visits the PS web site and submits: the donor identity idD, the
amount val to be donated, payment information (e.g. an account number),
and the public key to be anonymously certified.
3. After collection of the payment from the donor using the specified pay-
ment information, the PS uses the provided donor public key to create the
anonymised donor public key PD, and generates an APK certificate CertPD
for PD.
4. The donor uses the PS withdraw function to obtain a coin c of value val. The
donor can use this coin to make an anonymous e-donation to a participating
charity.
5.4 E-donation definition phase
This phase starts when a donor visits a charity web site and decides to donate
through this charity. After browsing through the available e-donation tokens pro-
vided by participating stores, he selects the token that satisfy his requirements
for value, donation type (e.g. food or clothing), validity period, and location
where the e-donation will be spent. Then the donor sends an e-donation request
to the charity. To construct the request, the donor signs a message that contains
the selected charity token and a time stamp T to ensure message freshness. The
donor send the message, along with his APK certificate CertPD , to the charity.
Donor −→ Charity : sSD ( token||T )||CertPD
After successful verification of the donor certificate, the signature on the
message, and the expiry date within token, the charity creates an entry c data
in a donation requests database. We assume that the charity keeps a database of
all donation requests received and awaiting use for generation of an e-donation.
I.e. it generates
c data = token||Serial number||Creation time
where Serial number is a number that uniquely identifies this entry and
Creation time indicates the date/time that the entry was created by the charity.
On generating the entry, the charity signs and sends a response message to
the donor. The message contains a signed copy of the generated entry along with
the charity certificate CertPC
Charity −→ Donor : c data||sSC ( c data)||CertPC
On receiving the above message, the donor verifies the signature and that
the entry was generated according to the donor requirements. If successful the
donor and the charity engage in an electronic cash payment protocol that allows
the donor to pay the coin c to the charity for the generated entry.
Donor ←→ Charity: Payment (c)
Upon receiving the payment from the donor, the charity interacts with the
PS in an electronic cash deposit protocol to deposit the received coin c′.
Charity ←→ PS: Deposit (c′)
If successful the charity adds the generated entry c data to its database of
donation requests. The donor must trust the charity to spend the donated coin
in the way requested.
5.5 Donation phase
In this phase, the recipient smart card and the charity terminal engage in an au-
thentication protocol during which the recipient smart card receives e-donations.
This protocol conforms to the mutual entity authentication mechanism specified
in clause 5.2.2 of ISO/IEC 9798-3 [1].
This phase begins when the recipient presents his card to receive e-donations.
First, the charity terminal reads the recipient’s identity idR and the recipient
card public key certificate CertPR from the card. Then, the charity generates
a random number r2 and sends it to the recipient card along with its unique
identifier idC .
1. Charity −→ Recipient : r2 ||idC
After receiving the message in step 1, the recipient card generates a random
number r3 as a challenge to the charity. It then creates a signed message that
contains r3, the charity identity idC and the received random number r2. The
recipient card sends the generated signature to the charity terminal along with
r3.
2. Recipient −→ Charity : r3||sSR(r2 || r3||idC)
After receiving the message in step 2, the charity terminal uses the recipient
card public key certificate CertPR to verify the received signature. If the verifi-
cation fails, the process is terminated and the card is rejected. Otherwise, the
charity terminal generates a response message that contains an e−donation and
sends it to the recipient card.
When a charity chooses to issue an e − donation to a recipient, it retrieves
an entry c data from the donation requests database and adds Issuance time,
the date/time this e− donation is issued, and the recipient unique identity idR
to that entry. Then, using its secret key KC, the charity terminal computes and
adds MACKC(c data||Issuance time||idR)) to the retrieved entry. Thus,
e−donation = c data||Issuance time||idR||MACKC(c data||Issuance time||idR)
The charity terminal now creates a signed message that contains the random
numbers received in step 2, the recipient identifier idR, and the e − donation.
The charity sends the e− donation and the generated signature to the recipient
card.
3. Charity −→ Recipient : e− donation||sSC ( r3|| r2||idR|| e− donation)
Upon receiving the message in step 3, the recipient card uses the stored char-
ity public key certificate to verify the charity signature. If the check fails, the
process is terminated and the card does not accept any information from the ter-
minal. Otherwise the card updates its stored list of e-donations. We assume that
the charity keeps a database of all e-donations issued during a specific period.
The charity also deletes the c data used in the e−donation generation from the
donation requests database, and adds an entry to the e-donations database.
5.6 Redemption phase
In this phase, the recipient card and the store terminal engage in an authentica-
tion protocol during which the store terminal retrieves e-donations stored in the
recipient card in exchange for goods. The recipient must trust the store terminal
not to remove e-donations not authorised by the recipient.
First, the store terminal reads the recipient unique identity idR, the card
expiry date, the charity public key certificate, the recipient card public key cer-
tificate and the list of e-donations. If the card has not expired, then the store
terminal verifies the recipient card public key certificate using the charity public
key certificate, which in turn can be verified using the CA’s public key known to
the store terminal. If successful, then the store terminal displays to the recipient
a list of unredeemed e-donations, from which the recipient selects the one that
is to be redeemed. Moreover, the store terminal asks the recipient card for a
challenge.
The recipient card responds by generating a random number r4 and sends it
to the store terminal.
1. Recipient −→ Store : r4
After receiving the message in step 1, the store terminal generates a random
number r5 as a challenge to the recipient card. It then creates a signed message
that contains r5, the store identity idS and the received random number r4. The
store terminal sends the generated signature to the recipient card along with r5,
idS and the store public key certificate CertPS .
2. Store −→ Recipient : r5||idS ||sSS ( r5|| idS ||r4)||CertPS
When the recipient card receives the message in step 2, it uses the stored CA
public key to verify the store’s public key certificate. If successful the card uses
it to verify the received signature. If the signature verifies successfully, the recip-
ient card responds with a message that contains the selected unspent e-donation
and a signature computed over the concatenation of that e− donation, r5, and
the identities of both the recipient and the store.
3. Recipient −→ Store : e− donation||sSR(e− donation||r5||idR||idS)
Upon receipt of the message in step 3, the store verifies the recipient card
signature. If the signature verifies successfully, then the store uses its secret
key KS to recompute MACKS(s data) and then checks the result against the
received e− donation. If the check succeeds then it accepts the e− donation as
valid and proceeds with providing the goods specified in the e− donation to the
recipient. Moreover, the recipient card marks the e− donation used in message
3 as spent.
To help protect the card against fraud by the store, the recipient card logs
message 3 for later settlement by the charity.
Similarly, protection of the store against the recipient is provided by exchang-
ing the goods stated in the e−donation for the message in step 3. The store later
uses message 3 to collect the corresponding monetary amount from the charity.
Typically, the transactions would be sent in a batch, signed by the store so that
the charity can verify the integrity and authenticity of the transaction batch.
6 Security analysis
In this section, we examine to what extent the generic security requirements
outlined in section 3 are met by our scheme.
6.1 Donor Anonymity
The anonymity of the donor is protected from the charity using the APK cer-
tificate, which allows a donation to be made to a charity without revealing the
donor’s real identity. Although the donor is not anonymous to the PS, since the
donor makes a payment in exchange for an APK certificate and an electronic
cash coin, it is not possible for the PS to know what donation a donor makes
because the coin used to make the donation is anonymous. The PS would need
to deanonymize the coin deposited by a charity to reveal the identity of the
withdrawer.
6.2 Double-spending
Protection from e-donation double spending is provided by means of smart cards.
Our e-donation scheme is an oﬄine system, i.e. the store does not need to contact
the charity for every redemption performed by a recipient. Instead, the scheme
relies on a tamper-resistant recipient card that uses cryptographic means to
recognize when it is communicating with a member of the scheme (e.g. charity
or store). The charity and the recipient trust the recipient card to update its list
of e-donations every time it is involved in a donation or redemption transaction
with a member of the scheme. Moreover, since the recipient card is tamper-
resistant, an attacker cannot modify the card contents without permanently
damaging the card. Therefore, the recipient cannot benefit more than once from
the same e-donation. The disadvantages of using the smart card approach is that
no card is completely tamper resistant, and the cost associated with setting up
the scheme may be significant.
On the other hand, the charity maintains a database of all e-donations which
have been issued. The charity uses the redeemed e-donations received from stores
and recipient cards logs to detect and punish double spending afterwards.
Typically, an e-donation would have a limited validity (days) to limit the
problems of forgery, and to limit the size of the e-donation database. This
database will be large, but not infeasibly so. There will need to be one database
record per generated e-donation.
6.3 Integrity
Integrity protection for the e-donation data is accomplished using message au-
thentication codes and digital signatures. Calculating a message authentication
code over parts of the messages exchanged using a key known only to the au-
thorised parties provides evidence to the verifier that the message content has
not been altered or destroyed, accidentally or with malicious intent, since it was
created.
For example, if an attacker decided to change the Item field found in the
s data part of e − donation to his benefit, the attacker would need to mod-
ify MACKS(s data) to reflect the new value of the Item field. However, our
scheme assumes that no one other than the store who computed the original
MACKS(s data) knows the key KS. Moreover, we assume that the MAC func-
tion used is secure. The use of a MAC thus prevents such an attack.
On the other hand, theft of e-donations paid to a store is prevented by making
such e-donations depositable only by that store. This is done by including the
identity of the store in the signature sSR(e − donation||r5||idR||idS), which is
created by the recipient card in step 3 of the Redemption phase.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have proposed a scheme to make and distribute charitable
donations electronically using the Internet and smart cards. We described the
scheme in detail, and explained how it meets the identified security requirements.
In the future, a prototype implementation of the scheme will be built using a
Java servelet and Java Card technology. The purpose of the prototype will be
to examine the efficiency of a possible practical deployment of the scheme.
It would be interesting to investigate how the proposed scheme could be
modified to allow the recipient to receive and redeem e-donations using a mobile
phone instead of a smart card.
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